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We develop a dynamic, general equilibrium model to understand how multinationals a⁄ect
host countries through knowledge di⁄usion. Workers learn from their managers and knowledge
di⁄usion takes place through worker mobility. We identify two forces that determine wages:
the labour demand e⁄ect and the learning e⁄ect. The former tends to raise wages while the
latter tends to reduce it. We show that in a model without learning, an integrated steady-state
equilibrium, in which incumbent host country managers operate alongside multinationals, can
never be a Pareto improvement for the host country. In contrast, we present a novel mechanism
through which a Pareto improvement occurs in the presence of learning dynamics. We study
how integration a⁄ects the life time earnings of agents and the degree of inequality in the host
country, as well as, analyze the pattern of multinational activity. In the quantitative section
of the paper, we calibrate our model to ￿t key moments from the U.S. wage distribution and
quantify gains from integration. Our estimates suggest that learning produces welfare gains that
range from 2% for the middle-income countries to 43% for the low-income countries.
KEYWORDS : Multinationals, knowledge di⁄usion, learning, welfare gains, worker mobility.
1 Introduction
One of the most important asset that a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) brings to a foreign market
is its possession of superior knowledge.1 Naturally, economists are concerned about whether and
how this knowledge di⁄uses to domestically owned ￿rms and the consequence of this di⁄usion for
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1This is a widely held belief in the business literature. See Kogut and Zander (1993).
1the ￿rms, the workers and the economy as a whole (Lipsey and Sj￿holm (2005), Blomstr￿m and
Kokko (1998)).
Existing studies of MNEs have focused on di⁄erent channels for knowledge di⁄usion.2 One such
channel, that has received relatively less attention, is di⁄usion through worker mobility. There is
evidence that MNEs provide more and better training to its workers compared to domestic ￿rms
(Gershenberg (1987)).3 MNEs provide domestic workers with access to a vast pool of advanced
knowledge. By learning from MNEs, these workers increase their productive capabilities. Some
of them even go on to start their own ￿rms. Giarratana et al (2003) talk about the spin-o⁄s
from MNEs that were created in India after the country liberalized in 1991. Based on interviews
conducted with the founders of some of these spin-o⁄s, Giarratana et al (2003) conclude that the
founders bring a high-level of technological expertise from the MNEs to the new ￿rms.
Moreover, in many developing countries, the educational system is not geared towards meeting
the needs of the industry. In these countries, foreign MNEs provide the domestic workers with
the opportunity to acquire marketable skills. For example, in China, potential managers think
of the MNEs as schools where they can train themselves, and then, once they have the required
expertise to start their own business, leave (The Economist, 2005). This could partly explain the
high turnover rates that the county has witnessed in recent years.4
Knowledge acquisition by the workers has an impact both on their life time earnings, as well as,
the productivity and pro￿tability of ￿rms which hire them. At the same time, as workers learn, the
entire knowledge distribution of the host-country changes, which in turn has aggregate implications.
In this paper, we build a model which not only allows us to study the impact of MNE entry on
welfare and earning dynamics at the individual level, but also the impact on inequality and the
pattern of multinational activity at the aggregate level.
We develop a dynamic, general equilibrium model, in which agents have di⁄erent levels of
knowledge. Our model adds learning to a framework that is similar to Antr￿s, Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006). In our model, production is carried out in ￿rms by workers who are supervised
by a manager. Agents make two decisions: (1) whether to be a worker or a manager and (2) who
to match with, i.e. a manager chooses his workers while a worker chooses for whom to work. The
production technology exhibits complementarity.5 Agents are endowed with knowledge at birth,
but can acquire more by working in ￿rms. We assume that workers learn on the job. Learning is
stochastic and depends both on the worker￿ s knowledge and the manager￿ s knowledge. In particular,
2Rodr￿guez-Clare (1996) focuses on the impact of multinationals on developing countries through the generation
of backward and forward linkages. In Markusen and Venables (1999), the e⁄ect on host country ￿rms depends on
the relative strengths of competition and linkage e⁄ects.
3G￿rg et al (2007) ￿nd that workers who are trained in subsidiaries of multinational ￿rms have a steeper wage
gradient compared to workers who receive training in local ￿rms. They take this as evidence that foreign subsidiaries
provide more e⁄ective training to workers.
4The Economist reports that employee turnover rates have gone up from 8.3% in 2001 to 11.3% in 2004. See
"China￿ s people problem", The Economist, 14th April, 2005.
5This means that the marginal productivity of an agent is enhanced if he matches with more knowledgeable agents.
2expected learning is an increasing function of both the worker￿ s and the manager￿ s knowledge. Thus,
there is also ￿ complementarity￿in learning.
In our model, when an agent is born, he draws his knowledge from an exogenously given distri-
bution. Agents also face a constant probability of death every period. Apart from the exogenous
entry and exit of agents, there is endogenous movement of agents within the knowledge distribution
due to learning. We show that the complementarity of the production and learning technologies
leads to positive assortative matching (PAM), whereby more knowledgeable workers team with
more knowledgeable managers to produce and learn. The equilibrium is characterized by a thresh-
old such that every agent below the threshold is a worker and those above are managers. However,
the combination of PAM and learning implies that every agent who starts his life as a worker, works
for better and better managers till he himself becomes a manager, provided that he survives long
enough. Thus, agents move up the knowledge ladder and their earnings increase over their lifetime.
Birth, learning and death determine the evolution of the knowledge distribution.
Our initial analysis focuses on a country in autarky. Next, we allow the Home country (or
the host country) to integrate with a Foreign country (or the source country) that has a di⁄erent
knowledge distribution.6 In particular, the Foreign newborn distribution dominates the Home
newborn distribution in the sense of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. This is a way to capture
the assumption that the Foreign country has relatively more knowledgeable agents compared to
the Home country. Integration, in our model, means that managers are able to form international
teams.7 At the same time, managers are rival factors.8 To understand the impact of integration
on the welfare of host-country agents, we ￿rst consider a version of the model where agents do not
learn. Integration leads to a re-adjustment among host country managers. The least knowledgeable
among them exit, whereas among those who persist as managers, some are now matched with less
knowledgeable workers. Under this situation, we show that some agents are necessarily worse-o⁄
compared to autarky. That is, we show that in the absence of learning, integration can never be a
Pareto improvement in an equilibrium where some incumbent host country managers operate.
Introducing learning complicates the analysis because the knowledge distribution becomes en-
dogenous. We identify two e⁄ects that determine wages. Upon integration, the wage schedule is
pushed up by the competition for workers coming from foreign MNEs. We call this the labour de-
mand e⁄ect. But now there is a second e⁄ect on wages. The entry of MNEs creates the possibility
for the workers to be matched with more knowledgeable managers. By working for the MNEs,
workers can learn more and earn more than under autarky. The result that MNEs hire the more
knowledgeable workers however implies that the less knowledgeable workers can expect to work for
6Throughout the paper, we use the terms "globalization", "integration" and "opening up" interchangeably.
7In this paper, MNEs are synonymous with international production teams. We abstract from the issue related to
the boundaries of international ￿rms. For some recent papers which deal with this issue, see AntrÆs (2003), AntrÆs
and Helpman (2004), and Grossman and Helpman (2003).
8Whether managers travel from the source-country to the host-country or not is irrelevant.
3the MNEs in the future only if they learn from their current managers. Thus learning creates a
rent. The managers extract a part of this rent by paying lower wages and thereby internalize the
knowledge "spillover". We call this the learning e⁄ect. We show that if learning is fast enough,
this e⁄ect dominates and the wage schedule shifts down enough so as to make the incumbent man-
agers better o⁄. The workers are better o⁄ too, because the increase in their continuation value
outweighs the reduction in current wage. We believe that this is a novel mechanism through which
integration, in the presence of learning, can lead to Pareto improvement.9
We analyze the model in more detail in the numerical section. Our model allows us to study the
evolution of individual earnings over the lifetime. By improving the matches, integration increases
the amount of knowledge that agents can acquire in each period. This increases the gradient of
the lifetime earnings function. For slow learning, integration also reduces consumption inequality.
Inequality, however rises if agents are learning faster. In this case, integration ampli￿es the initial
inequality in the Home country. Our model also sheds light on the pattern of multinational activity.
First, domestic ￿rms and MNEs coexist. Furthermore, depending on the relative endowments of
knowledge in the two countries, we may observe multinational activity in both directions.
In the quantitative section, we calibrate the closed-economy model to match key moments of the
U.S. wage distribution. Then we ask the following question : How much do the developing countries
gain by moving from autarky to frictionless integration with the average developed country? We
focus on bilateral integration rather than multilateral integration since we want to show how the
host country bene￿ts from integrating with a country which, in some sense, has a relatively greater
endowment of knowledgeable agents. Using parameter values obtained from the calibration, we
￿nd welfare gains that range from two percent for the richest middle-income countries to almost
forty-three percent for the poorest countries. Most of these gains can be attributed to learning,
rather than e¢ cient allocation of managerial talent across countries.
Our paper is related to Monge-Naranjo (2007) who also studies the impact of MNEs on the
domestic accumulation of skills. He develops a two period overlapping generations model where
young agents can either be workers or potential managers. The latter can acquire knowledge and
become managers when they are old. When an economy opens up, foreign entrepreneurs, who have
higher knowledge than their domestic counterparts, relocate and carry out production with local
workers. In his model, potential managers and entrepreneurs are homogenous, and consequently,
every potential manager learns the same. In contrast, workers and managers in our model are
heterogenous and learning is speci￿c to the worker-manager pair. This assumption, by generating
a non-trivial knowledge distribution, allows us to study the impact of integration on the distribution
of consumption, the dynamics of individual earnings and the pattern of multinational activity.10
9See Fosfuri et al (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002) for game-theoritic treatments of knowledge di⁄usion through
worker mobility.
10For quantitative models that compute static welfare gains associated with multinational production see Ramondo
(2008), Garetto (2008) and Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2008). Rodr￿guez-Clare (2007) develops a model of trade
4On the empirical side, Poole (2006) uses matched employer-employee data from Brazil to inves-
tigate whether knowledge spillovers occur through worker mobility. She ￿nds that (1) higher-skilled
former MNE workers are better able to convey knowledge while higher-skilled incumbent domestic
workers are better able to absorb knowledge and (2) incumbent production workers learn more
from former MNE workers or managers. Her ￿ndings form the basis of our assumption about how
workers learn within ￿rms.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model while
in Section 3, we study the properties of a stationary equilibrium. In Section 4, we analyze how
integration a⁄ects welfare in the host country. We study a numerical example in Section 5 and use
it to further characterize the equilibrium. Section 6 discusses the calibration and the quantitative
results. Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Our model introduces learning and dynamics to a framework that is similar to Antr￿s, Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), henceforth AGR. There is a continuum of heterogeneous agents who
vary in terms of their knowledge. Knowledge is embodied in an agent, but can be acquired through
interactions, i.e. an agent can learn from others. Knowledge includes any quality that enhances
productivity, for example, management skills and experience. One can think of knowledge as some
composite of di⁄erent attributes that a⁄ects an agent￿ s productive capability.11
Time is discrete and the time horizon is in￿nite. Every period, agents are born. A newborn agent
draws his knowledge from an exogenously given distribution ￿(k) with support [k;k] (￿(k) being the
corresponding density). At the same time, each agent dies in any period with a constant probability
￿: The actual knowledge distribution at time t, ￿t(k) ( t(k) being the corresponding density) as
well as the invariant distribution, will, of course, depend on ￿(k):12 We assume that knowledge
is perfectly observable and thereby abstract from asymmetric informational issues. Agents are
risk-neutral.
Production : Production of a single, non-storable good is carried out in ￿rms. We call this
good GDP. A ￿rm comprises of a manager and production workers. Production workers do routine
jobs and each production worker combines with the manager to produce f(y) units of output,
where y is the knowledge of the manager. Thus, "f(y) captures the indivisibility of management-
type decisions and implies a scale economy because it improves productivity of all the workers in
the ￿rm, irrespective of their numbers" as in Rosen (1982, p. 314). Notice that the productivity of
workers in a ￿rm run by a manager with knowledge y is simply f(y). The manager pays wages to
and di⁄usion where growth is caused by technological progress. Unlike our model, however, di⁄usion of ideas is an
exogenous process.
11For a trade model where agents have two attributes, see Ohnsorge and Tre￿ er (2007).
12In the absence of learning, any initial distribution will ultimately converge to ￿(k):
5the workers and is the residual claimant of the output.13
The span of control of a manager depends only on the knowledge of the workers he hires. The
span of control is given by n(x;￿), where x is the knowledge of the worker.1415 For a given x;
￿ measures the span of control with @n
@￿ > 0: Henceforth, we suppress the dependence of n on ￿
and introduce it only when necessary. Apart from the knowledge of the worker and the manager,
output also depends on local conditions like government policies, infrastructure, political stability,
etc.16 We denote local conditions by ￿: A ￿rm faces the ￿ of the country in which it is producing.
Total output of a ￿rm is then given by
q = ￿f(y)n(x) (1)
We make the following assumptions regarding technology -
ASSUMPTION 1a : f0(y) > 0;f00(y) ￿ 0;n0(x) > 0;n00(x) < 0:
ASSUMPTION 1b : @
@y[
f0(y)






Assumptions 1a, 1b and 1c together imply that output is more sensitive to the knowledge of the
manager relative to that of the worker. Assumption 1c also says that for a given knowledge distri-
bution, there should be su¢ cient asymmetry between the manager and the worker￿ s contribution
to output.17 This is a su¢ cient condition for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.18
Learning : Agents also learn in ￿rms.19 Since the seminal work of Gary Becker (Becker (1962)),
economists have been studying on-the-job training. In this paper, we abstract from formal training
provided by ￿rms and instead focus on the knowledge that workers acquire simply by associating
13Here, as in Monge-Naranjo (2007), we assume that there is no di⁄erence between the managers and entrepreneurs.
For a model which make this distinction, see Holmes and Schmitz (1990).
14Managers could potentially choose di⁄erent types of workers. However measure consistency implies that a man-
ager can never be matched with an interval of workers. Given the technology, it can also be shown that in equilibrium,
the manager would not want to hire more than one type of worker. See AGR for the proofs.
15For a micro-foundation of such a technology, see Garicano (2000).
16Our assumption that labour is the only factor of production is without loss of generality. We can always introduce
capital. The cost of capital usually has three components - sunk cost, ￿xed cost and variable cost. In the absence
of uncertainty in production and credit market imperfections, the ￿rst two do not really have any e⁄ect. So we just
normalize those to zero. As for variable capital requirement, we think of it as being subsumed in f(y).






f(y) ; while that of the worker
is
n0(x)x
n(x) : Assumption 1b says that
f0(y)
















18If we relax this assumption, proving uniqueness becomes very di¢ cult.
19As pointed out by Rosen (1972, p. 326), "education is not produced only in schools and learning does not cease
after graduation.......Rather learning and work are complementary..........In fact, learning in the workplace is extremely
widespread and characterizes almost all labour market activities."
6with the manager. We follow Jovanovic and Rob (1989) in de￿ning our learning technology. Within
each ￿rm, the worker learns from the manager.20 Learning is stochastic and depends both on the
knowledge of the manager and the worker. The randomness in learning does not necessarily re￿ ect
any randomness in the knowledge transfer process but rather, is a simplistic way of modelling
the heterogeneity in the capacity to absorb knowledge. A worker with knowledge x at time t has
knowledge x0 at time t + 1. The learning distribution is given by L(x0jx;y); x0 2 [x;y]: We make
the following assumptions about the learning technology:
ASSUMPTION 2a : @
@x[
R
h(x0)d L(x0jx;y)] > 0 8 h(x0) increasing in x0:
ASSUMPTION 2b : @
@y[
R
h(x0)d L(x0jx;y)] > 0 8 h(x0) increasing in x0:
The above conditions are the familiar ones for ￿rst-order stochastic dominance.21 These con-
ditions imply that expected learning is increasing in the knowledge of both the workers and the
managers.
Agent￿ s problem : Every agent is a price-taker. There are two prices in the economy. First,
the managers hire workers and pay a price for their marginal product. Second, the workers learn
from the managers and pay a price for the acquired knowledge. It is inconsequential whether there
are two transactions within the ￿rm or whether the managers simply pay the wage net of the rent
(on this point, see Rosen(1972)). What matters is the net payment to workers, and hence we focus
on net wages wt.
Given a sequence of wage functions fwtg1
t=0; the manager￿ s problem is de￿ned recursively as
VM(y;wt) = sup
x
f￿f(y)n(x) ￿ wt(x)n(x) + (1 ￿ ￿)max[VW(y;wt+1);VM(y;wt+1)]g: (2)
where VW(y;wt) is the value function of an agent with knowledge y, if he chooses to be a worker
while VM(y;wt) is the value function if, instead, he chooses to be a manager.22 The value of a
manager depends on the current distribution ￿t(k) through the net wage schedule wt: That is why
wt is treated as a state variable. The second term on the right captures the fact that an agent, who
is a manager at time t; might choose to be a worker at time t + 1 if the wage schedule changes.
VW(y;wt) is given by




20Unlike Jovanovic and Rob (1989), learning is one-sided. Assuming that managers also learn from workers could
be an interesting extension and would be one channel through which growth can be introduced in this model.
21For a distribution to ￿rst-order stochastic dominate another distribution, their supports have to be the same.
In this case, ￿(x
0jx1;y) and ￿(x
0jx2;y), x1 > x2; have di⁄erent support. But we can always think of ￿(x
0jx1;y) as
having support [x2;y] with zero mass in [x2;x1]: The same logic applies to ￿(x
0jx;y1) and ￿(x
0jx;y2):
22Notice the absence of time discounting in the above formulation. This is due to the fact that a positive probability
of death acts as a discount factor.
7where mt(x) is the knowledge of the manager who hires a worker with knowledge x. The term within
the integral denotes the expected value of the worker if he works for a manager with knowledge
mt(x). Depending on how much he learns, the worker might become a manager or continue as
a worker at t + 1. As before, this decision will depend not only on the worker￿ s own knowledge
but also on the market wage schedule. The following two lemmas establish existence and some
properties of the value functions.
Lemma 1 VM(y;w) exists, and is continuous and strictly increasing in y:
Lemma 2 VW(x;w) exists, and is continuous and strictly increasing in x:
Matching : Notice that the problem of the manager is essentially static since he does not
learn. Therefore the manager chooses his workers in order to maximize his current pro￿ts
￿t(y) = ￿f(y)n(x) ￿ wt(x)n(x):
The ￿rst-order condition (FOC) for the manager￿ s problem is
(￿f(y) ￿ wt(x))n0(x) ￿ w0
t(x)n(x) = 0:
Re-arranging, we have w0
t(x) =
(￿f(y)￿wt(x))n0(x)
n(x) : Pro￿t-maximization implies that the numera-
tor is positive. Thus, w0
t(x) > 0: It can easily be shown that wt(x) is continuous.
Totally di⁄erentiating the FOC,
￿[(￿f(y) ￿ wt(x))n00(x) ￿ 2w0
t(x)n0(x) ￿ w00




Pro￿t-maximization implies that the LHS is positive.23 So is f0(y)n0(x). Therefore
dy
dx > 0, i.e.
more knowledgeable workers will work for more knowledgeable managers. Hence we have Positive
Assortative Matching (PAM).24 PAM implies that mt(x) exists and m0
t(x) > 0:25
In equilibrium, there exists a threshold k￿
t such that all agents with knowledge less than k￿
t are
workers, while those with knowledge above k￿
t are managers (We formally de￿ne equilibrium in the







t (x)n(x) < 0:
24Here it is worth mentioning why we need the technological restriction linking the span of control to the knowledge
of the workers. Consider a production function of the form q = f(y)g(nx). The manager chooses both n and x to
maximize ￿ = f(y)g(nx) ￿ nw(x) . The FOC with respect to n gives f(y)g
0(nx)x = w(x) while that with respect
to x gives f(y)g
0(nx)n = nw
0(x): Combining we get w
0(x) =
w(x)
n : Thus the wage schedule is linear which means
that the workers are perfect substitutes. Hence, as in Lucas (1978), the manager will be indi⁄erent between hiring
workers with di⁄erent levels of knowledge.
25The fact that complementarity in production leads to PAM is a standard result in the matching literature.







t (s))d￿t(s) 8k ￿ k￿
t (4)
Note that the labour market condition is not standard. The LHS denotes the supply of workers
in the interval [k;k], while the RHS denotes the demand for workers coming from managers in the
interval [mt(k);mt(k)]: Measure consistency requires that these two values must be equal for every
k. That is because, the workers hired by managers with knowledge in [mt(k);mt(k)] must have
knowledge in [k;k]: An implication of PAM is that mt(k) is monotone increasing. This allows us






The above di⁄erential equation, along with the boundary conditions mt(k) = k￿
t and mt(k￿
t) = k;
allows us to solve for the matching function. As the following lemma shows, given a ￿t(k); the
threshold k￿
t and consequently the matching function are uniquely determined.
Lemma 3 Given a ￿t(k); k￿
t exists and is unique.
The above discussion suggests that the matches can be determined completely once we know
the knowledge distribution; we do not need to know the wage schedule in order to determine the
matches. Rather, once the matches are determined, wages adjust so as to support the matches that
emerge. Of course, this does not mean that how agents match does not depend on wages. In this
economy, wages (and pro￿ts) not only determine the remuneration of the agents but they also play
an allocative role (Sattinger(1993)). But for the purpose of solving the model, we can derive the
matching function without any information on the wage function.
Dynamics : When workers work for managers, they learn. Accordingly, their knowledge
increases over time. But agents also die every period with probability ￿ and are replaced by
newborns who draw knowledge from the exogenous distribution ￿(k): Birth, learning and death
implies a rule for the evolution of the knowledge distribution ￿t(k) :





dL(s0js;mt(s))d￿t(s) for all k 2 [k;k] (6)
The ￿rst term on the RHS denotes the fraction of agents who are born in period t + 1 with
knowledge less than k. The second term denotes the agents from period t who remain below k
despite learning from their managers. There is another way of looking at the evolution. Let A be
9any Borel set of [k;k]. Then the transition function for the knowledge distribution satis￿es, for

















Equation (6) implies that ￿t+1 is determined by how individuals acquire knowledge in period t;
and the acquisition of knowledge by individuals is determined only by who they match with at time
t, which in turn depends only on ￿t: Therefore, ￿t+1 is a function of ￿t: We seek a ￿xed point of
￿t; i.e. an invariant knowledge distribution ￿￿: As the following proposition shows, such a ￿xed
point exists and is unique.
Proposition 1 A unique, invariant knowledge distribution ￿￿ exists and any initial distribution
￿0 weakly converges to it.
Therefore, in the long run, the knowledge distribution converges to ￿￿; with threshold k￿:
Agents, who are born with knowledge above k￿; become managers instantaneously. Since managers
do not learn, these agents are stuck with the level of knowledge they are born with. On the other
hand, agents, who are born with knowledge below k￿; start their lives as workers. These agents
learn in every period and move up, till they eventually cross the threshold and become managers
themselves. For these agents, the lifetime earnings pro￿les are positively sloped.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Autarky
Now, we formally de￿ne an equilibrium of this model. A competitive equilibrium of this economy
consists of :
1. value functions VW(x;wt) : [k;k￿
t] ! R and VM(y;wt) : [k￿
t;k] ! R;
2. a matching function mt(x) : [k;k￿
t] ! [k￿
t;k];
3. prices wt(x) : [k;k￿
t] ! R and ￿t(y) : [k￿
t;k] ! R; and
4. an occupational choice structure : workers 2 [k;k￿
t] and managers 2 [k￿
t;k]
such that
(a) VW(x;wt) and VM(y;wt) satisfy the worker￿ s and manager￿ s problems respectively (VW(k￿
t;wt) =
VM(k￿
t;wt) and V 0
W(k￿
t;wt) ￿ V 0
M(k￿
t;wt)); 26
26If this condition is not satis￿ed, then k can hire k
￿
t + ￿ and both of them can be made strictly better-o⁄. But
then k
￿
t can not be an equilibrium. The formal proof is in the Appendix.
10(b) mt(x) and m￿1
t (y) are the corresponding policy functions;
(c) markets for worker clears, that is equation (4) is satis￿ed; and
(d) the distribution evolves according to equation (6).
The following proposition provides for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exists a ￿￿; such that 8￿ > ￿￿; an equilibrium exists and it is unique.
Moreover, this equilibrium is e¢ cient.
A stationary equilibrium of this model consists of value functions, a matching function, prices
and an occupational choice (all independent of time), such that workers and managers are maxi-
mizing welfare, labour market clears and ￿t+1 = ￿t = ￿￿: Henceforth, we focus on the stationary
distribution.
It might seem natural to write the wage as w(x;y) given that (a) the same manager can produce
di⁄erent levels of output by hiring di⁄erent types of workers and (b) the same worker can acquire
di⁄erent levels of knowledge by working for di⁄erent managers. (a) suggests that the price for
labour should be speci￿c to a worker-manager pair while (b) suggests that the same should be true
for the price of knowledge. In order to understand why w(x) only has the knowledge of the worker
as its argument, we look at the underlying mechanism by which these objects are determined.
First, we consider an economy without learning. In this economy, every agent with knowledge
y; in the role of a manager, o⁄ers a wage schedule e wNL(x;y). This wage schedule is such that y
is indi⁄erent between hiring any x: Denote the corresponding pro￿t of y as e ￿(y): The following
lemma establishes some properties of e wNL(x;y):
Lemma 4 e wNL(x;y) is continuous and increasing in x for all y:
At the same time, each agent, in the role of a worker, faces a series of wages o⁄ered by the other
agents. If e ￿(x) > max
y e wNL(x;y); agent x becomes a manager. Otherwise, he becomes a worker and
works for y(x) where y(x) = argmax e wNL(x;y): Hence, the occupation of agents is endogenously
determined. Equilibrium is obtained when every agent is employed and is maximizing utility. The
equilibrium wage schedule is given by e wNL(x;y(x)) ￿ wNL(x), i.e. wNL(x) is the upper envelope
of the individual wage schedules.27
Consider what happens when we introduce learning. Now, the worker acquires knowledge from
the manager, which raises the former￿ s continuation value. Thus, learning creates a rent and
27To understand why this is an equilibrium, consider an arbitrary worker with knowledge x
￿: By the de￿nition of
wNL(x); he maximizes his utility by getting wNL(x
￿): Let the manager who o⁄ers this wage be denoted by y
￿: To
11the manager tries to extract a part of this rent by paying a wage that is lower than what he
would have paid in the absence of learning. If e w(x;y) is the wage under learning then e w(x;y) =
e wNL(x;y) ￿ C(x;y).28 Each manager now o⁄ers a pair fe w(x;y);k(x;y)g where k(x;y) is the
expected knowledge that a worker x can acquire by working for manager y:29 That is, each manager
e⁄ectively o⁄ers a e VW(x;y) schedule since the current wage and expected future knowledge level
determines the present value of the workers. The equilibrium VW(x;wt) schedule is the upper
envelope of the individual e VW(:)s: The VW(x;wt) and wt(x) schedules are related such that the
manager who maximizes the present value of earnings of x; also o⁄ers the highest wage to x. This
is stated formally in the next lemma.
Lemma 5 If y￿ is the solution to argmax
y
e w(x;y); then it also solves argmax
y
e VW(x;y):
Lemma 5 implies that if worker x maximizes the pro￿t of manager y; then it must be the case
that manager y also maximizes the welfare of worker x. Before proceeding any further, we make
the following assumption about the learning technology :
ASSUMPTION 2c : If, in period t; a worker with knowledge x works for a manager with
knowledge y; then in period t+1; the worker has knowledge x with probability ￿ and knowledge y
with probability 1 ￿ ￿:
Thus, learning is an all-or-nothing proposition for the worker. This assumption gives us ana-
lytical tractability. In the next section, we relax this assumption and work with a more general
learning technology. Notice that, in spite of the learning distribution having just two points, it still
satis￿es assumptions 2a and 2b.30 Recall that the density function for the newborn distribution is
given by ￿(k): The learning technology, along with the newborn distribution, implicitly de￿nes the
invariant distribution and allows us to solve for the threshold k￿:
see why y


















where the third line follows from the de￿nition of e wNL(:) and the last line follows from the fact that wNL(:) is the
upper envelope of the individual e wNL(:) schedules. Therefore, y
￿ maximizes his utility by hiring x
￿: Since, x
￿ was
chosen arbitrarily, the result follows. Note that wNL(x) increasing in x and continuous (follows from the properties
of e wNL(x;y)).
28Note that the wage schedule o⁄ered by the manager is such that the manager is indi⁄erent between hiring any
worker. Consequently, the wage schedule must shift down.
29This is similar to Boyd and Prescott (1987), where the old workers in a ￿rm o⁄er the young a package of current
consumption and future expertise.
30To see this, note that for any h(:);h
0 > 0; the expected value of h(x) is ￿h(x) + (1 ￿ ￿)h(y): This expression is
increasing in both x and y:






















The above expression sheds light on how the distribution changes as the rate of learning in-
creases. ￿; being the probability of death in a period, proxies for the length of a time period. A
lower ￿; holding ￿ unchanged, implies that agents are acquiring the same expected knowledge over a
smaller interval of time. On the other hand, a lower ￿; holding ￿ unchanged, implies that agents are
acquiring more expected knowledge over the same interval of time. Both these cases translate into
faster learning for the agents. As the rate of learning increases, the knowledge distribution becomes
negatively-skewed as more and more mass is shifted to the upper tail. Consequently, labour market
clearing requires that the threshold shift to the right. The threshold also rises with an increase in
the span of control (higher ￿): Intuitively, a greater span of control implies that fewer managers
are required to employ the workers.
Recall that a worker with knowledge k produces f(m(k)) units of output. Hence, total output













In this model, individual welfare equals the present value of consumption (or income, since the
good is non-storable) because agents are risk-neutral.
3.2 International Integration
Next, we allow the host country to integrate with another country. Globalization or international
integration, in the context of our model, means that managers from one country can hire workers
in another country, i.e. integration leads to the creation of MNEs. However, the managerial input
is rival and as a result, managers can not operate plants in both countries. The motive behind
13the formation of MNEs is exploiting di⁄erences in factor prices.31 In this paper, we focus on full
integration, i.e. we assume that MNEs are formed costlessly. In particular, we assume away any
cost that might be associated with opening a plant in another country. We do acknowledge that
these costs are important, but the introduction of such costs will increase the complexity of the
model (see AGR on this issue).
Let us introduce some notation. De￿ne the subscripts i = fA;Ig; j = fH;Fg, where A
and I stand for autarky and integration respectively, while H and F stand for Home and Foreign
respectively. We label the host country Home. The Home newborn distribution is denoted by
￿H(k) with support [k;kH]; while the Foreign newborn distribution is ￿F(k); with [k;kF] being the
corresponding support. We assume that kF > kH and that ￿F(k) ￿rst-order stochastic dominates
￿H(k). This assumption captures the relative abundance of more knowledgeable agents in the
Foreign country. We also assume that ￿F = ￿H; where ￿H and ￿F denote the Home and Foreign
country-speci￿c productivity respectively. The steady-state knowledge distributions are indexed by
i and j. So, for example, ￿AH(k) is the Home steady-state knowledge distribution under autarky,
￿I(k) is the integrated distribution, and so on. PH and PF are the population in the two countries.




PH+PF ￿H(k) + PF
PH+PF ￿F(k) for k 2 [k;kH]
PH
PH+PF + PF
PH+PF ￿F(k) for k 2 [kH;kF]
(9)
￿I(k), combined with the learning technology, determines the integrated knowledge distribution
￿I(k): The new threshold, k￿
I; would typically be di⁄erent from k￿
A; the autarky threshold. In order
to derive the relation between the thresholds under autarky and integration, we need the following
lemma.





H are the thresholds under G and H respectively.
Now, ￿I(k) ￿rst-order stochastic dominates ￿H(k):32 In the benchmark case of no-learning,
the knowledge distributions in both the countries coincide with the newborn distributions. Conse-
quently, under no-learning, k￿
I > k￿
A (this follows directly from Lemma 6): With learning, however,
the knowledge distributions are no longer exogenous and this complicates the analysis. Still, we
can derive a relation between k￿
A and k￿
I; as shown by the following proposition.
31This motive for establishing subsidiaries in other countries is the same as in Helpman (1984).


















where pH = PH
PH+PF and pF = PF
PH+PF
Proposition 4 implies that the knowledge range for workers at Home expands under integration.
The agents belonging to [k￿
A;k￿
I]; who were managers under autarky, decide to become workers
under integration. The entry of highly knowledgeable managers from the Foreign country raises
the opportunity cost of being a manager for a domestic agent. An incumbent Home manager
weighs the cost of becoming a worker for a MNE (forgone current pro￿ts) against the bene￿t
(higher expected pro￿ts in the future). For the managers in [k￿
A;k￿
I]; bene￿ts outweigh costs and
consequently they switch.
Although Proposition 4 indicates the direction of change for the threshold, it says nothing about
its magnitude. In particular, we could have the following two scenarios :
(I) k￿
I > kH : In this case, every agent born in the Home country starts his life as a worker.
The support of ￿IH(k) is [k;kF], despite the fact that, the Home newborn distribution ￿H(k) still
has the smaller support.33 Though theoretically an interesting case, this situation is quite extreme
because it implies that integration results in the destruction of all incumbent ￿rms (managers),
who are replaced by a new class of bigger and more productive ￿rms.
(II) k￿
I < kH : This situation is characterized by the birth of a new class of Home ￿rms (with
knowledge in [kH;kF]), who are on par with the Foreign MNEs in terms of size and productivity.
But unlike Case I, a set of incumbent Home managers with knowledge in [k￿
I;kH] continues to
operate in the integrated economy.
Whether we are in Case I or Case II depends on the parameters of the model. For a given kH;
there exists a k0 such that kF < k0 implies that k￿
I < kH:34 Hence, as long as kF is not too di⁄erent
from kH, there will be some incumbent managers in the Home country. Intuitively, kF being much
greater than kH implies that following integration, the Home agents have an opportunity to work
for very knowledgeable managers. This is also true for the incumbent Home managers, who would
rather work in Foreign MNEs, learn and become much better managers in the future than remain
managers with low levels of knowledge.
33It is not the case that every Home agent is a worker. There are Home managers in [k
￿
I;m(kH)]: This, however,
means that the Home managers in the integrated economy have knowledge greater than kH:
34This follows from the result that k
￿
I is monotone increasing in kF; and k
￿
I < kH when kF = kH:
15Integration also a⁄ects matching. An immediate implication of Proposition 4 is that mI(k) >
mA(k); where mA(:) and mI(:) are the matching functions under autarky and integration respec-
tively.35 Therefore, the least knowledgeable worker in the Home country, and by continuity, a set of
less knowledgeable workers, is matched with better managers. On the other hand, some of the Home
managers are now matched with less able workers. Since the output of ￿rms depends positively on
workers￿knowledge, the output of some of the Home ￿rms under integration are necessarily lower
than in autarky.
Corollary 1 Under integration, the output of a positive measure of Home ￿rms goes down.
Note that since the output produced by a worker depends only on the knowledge of the manager
he is matched with, the productivity of a ￿rm, as measured by the value-added per worker, does
not change.
















The di⁄erence between the two arises from the fact that, in an integrated equilibrium, a part of
the Home output goes to the Foreign country as pro￿ts of Foreign MNEs, while some of the Home
￿rms may become multinationals and earn pro￿ts from their operations in the Foreign country.








To sum up, with integration, the threshold of the knowledge distribution shifts to the right.
This necessarily means that some of the Home workers work for more knowledgeable managers.
These workers also learn more compared to autarky. At the same time, some of the incumbent
￿rms su⁄er a decline in output. In the next section, we study the impact of integration on the
welfare of the Home workers and managers.
35To see this, note that mA(k) = k
￿
A and mI(k) = k
￿
I: Proposition 4 then gives the result.
164 Welfare
In this section, we analyze how learning alters the nature of welfare gains for the workers and
managers in the Home country. We focus our attention on the case where there are surviving Home
managers, i.e. Case II.36 First we look at the benchmark case of no learning. This is, essentially,
the static framework presented in AGR. We ask the interested reader to look at their paper for
a detailed and insightful analysis of this case. Shutting down the learning channel simpli￿es the
analysis because the knowledge distributions coincide with the newborn distributions, which are
exogenously given. Absence of learning also means that agents can be labelled workers or managers
depending on their knowledge at birth.
A result that emerges from AGR is that integration raises aggregate consumption, and with risk-
neutral agents, the aggregate welfare of the Home economy. What about individual welfare? In the
previous section, we showed that the output produced by the less knowledgeable Home managers
goes down under integration.37 The actual change in pro￿ts and welfare, however, depends on the
wages they pay. These wages would be di⁄erent from those under autarky. Of course, as wages
change, the welfare of the workers change too. The next proposition shows us how the welfare of
Home agents changes following integration.
Proposition 5 In a no-learning world, an integrated steady-state equilibrium with incumbent
Home ￿rms can never be a Pareto improvement relative to the autarky steady-state equilib-
rium in the Home country.
The above proposition tells us that in the absence of learning, integration creates winners and
losers. The identity of the winners and losers, though, will depend on the speci￿c parameter values.
If we think of workers and managers as two separate factors of production, Proposition 5 essentially
gives us a Heckscher-Ohlin like result.38
Does Proposition 5 continue to hold when we introduce learning? In order to prove otherwise,
we have to show that every agent in the Home economy is strictly better o⁄ under integration.
Corollary 1 implies that some of the Home managers earn lower revenue compared to autarky.39
Hence, for them to be better-o⁄under integration, the wage bill has to go down more than revenue.
In this model, there are two forces that determine wages. First, there is a labour demand e⁄ect.
The entry of Foreign MNEs increases the demand for Home workers. Integration also increases
competition faced by the Home workers from their Foreign counterparts. As shown by AGR, (1)
36The reason for this is the following : If kF is very di⁄erent from kH; then irrespective of whether agents learn,
every Home agent is better o⁄working for the more knowledgable Foreign managers. Thus we get Pareto improvement
but Home ￿rms disappear completely.
37This is true for both the learning and no-learning case.
38To be technically correct, we have in￿nitely many factors.
39Recall that there is only one good. Hence output equals revenue.
17if the two countries are not too similar and (2) if the span of control is not too small, the labour
demand e⁄ect raises the wages of all Home workers.40
But there is now a learning e⁄ect. In our model, a worker can be hired by any manager
with a positive probability. Working for a better manager means higher expected learning and
consequently, higher revenue. Hence, the entry of highly knowledgeable Foreign managers raises the
continuation value of the Home workers. PAM implies that the most knowledgeable managers hire
only the most knowledgeable workers. Therefore, the less knowledgeable workers can hope to work
for the MNEs if they learn and acquire enough knowledge. Thus learning creates a rent. Moreover,
these workers can learn only from their current managers, some of whom are the incumbent Home
managers. This allows the managers to compress the wage. The workers accept this wage reduction
because they expect to be compensated in the future (when they become managers). So the learning
e⁄ect tends to lower the wage schedule. The strength of this e⁄ect depends on how fast agents are
learning.
The total impact on wages depends on the relative strengths of the two e⁄ects. The following
Proposition shows us the condition under which the Home economy realizes Pareto gains.
Proposition 6 Under Assumption 2c, the integrated steady-state equilibrium is a Pareto improve-





2f(kH)[n(kH) ￿ n(k)] + n(k)[￿(kH)f(kH) ￿ ￿(k)f(k)]
￿(k)[f(kF) + f(k)]n(k) ￿ ￿(kH)[n(k) + n(kH)]f(kH)
where ￿(k) =
n(k)
1+n(k) and ￿(kH) =
n(kH)
1+n(kH):
Let us denote by ￿; the set of pairs of ￿ and ￿ that satisfy the above condition. The LHS of the
above expression is positive by de￿nition. The numerator of the fraction on the RHS is positive
too.41 For ￿ to be non-empty, the denominator has to be positive.




n(k) ; i.e. the degree
of asymmetry between the manager￿ s and the worker￿ s contribution to output. The greater is this
asymmetry, the greater is the increase in the earnings of the worker when he becomes a manager
and the greater is the wage cut that the worker is willing to accept in order to learn.
Proposition 6 also sheds light on how welfare changes as we change the rate of learning. Assum-
ing that the RHS of the expression in Proposition 6 is positive, the inequality will not be satis￿ed
if learning is very slow. In the limiting case of no-learning, ￿ = 1 (or ￿ = 1), the LHS is equal
to zero. As we start reducing ￿ (or ￿) i.e. raise the rate of learning, the LHS starts to increase
and at some point, it is greater than the RHS. Recall from Proposition 3 that k￿
I is decreasing in
40For a similar e⁄ect in a trade model, see Melitz (2003).
41Since
n(k)
1+n(k) is increasing in k:
18both ￿ and ￿: Therefore, if the rate of learning continues to increase, eventually k￿
I exceeds kH: In
this case, integration still generates Pareto gains for the Home country, but at the cost of all the
incumbent Home ￿rms (see previous section).
Corollary 1 stated that some of the incumbent ￿rms produce less under integration relative to
autarky. For these ￿rms to be better o⁄, they have to pay lower wages to the workers. Corollary 2
follows.
Corollary 2 If all Home agents gain from integration, Home workers must be earning a lower wage
compared to autarky.
In our model, if a MNE has more knowledge than an incumbent Home ￿rm, PAM implies that,
the workers in the MNE are more knowledgeable than the ones in the Home ￿rm. PAM also implies
that after working for the MNE, a worker never works for the Home ￿rm. Therefore, there is no
￿ ow of knowledge from the MNE to the Home ￿rm. Despite this, the incumbent ￿rm can be made
better o⁄ if learning is fast enough.42 Of course, some of the former multinational workers set up
their own ￿rms and these managers directly bene￿t from the superior knowledge of MNEs.43
5 Numerical analysis
To further our understanding of the model, we resort to numerical analysis. We study how the
equilibrium changes with the rate of learning, and whether the welfare results from the previous
section go through for a more general learning technology. We go on to analyze the evolution of
individual earnings over the lifetime, the change in inequality due to integration and the pattern
of multinational activity. Throughout, our focus is on the Home economy.
The only change from the last section is in the learning technology. We assume that a worker
with knowledge x, and working for a manager with knowledge y, draws his knowledge in the next
period from a distribution which is uniform on [x;y]. The production function is given by f(y) = y￿;
n(x;￿) = x￿: Finally, we assume that the distribution of newborns is a truncated exponential in
[1;k] with parameter ￿: By setting k = 1; we are implicitly setting the size of the smallest ￿rm to
two (one manager and one worker). The following ￿gures are drawn for ￿ = 1; ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 1;
￿H = ￿F = 1; kH = 1:5; kF = 1:75:
5.1 Earnings and Welfare
In Figure 1, we compare the Home and Foreign economies under autarky. Figure 1a shows the
welfare of an agent as a function of his knowledge at birth. The only di⁄erence between the
42The traditional view regarding knowledge spillover is that workers with experience in MNEs are hired by domestic
managers. These workers bring with them knowledge regarding better technology and management practises and the
domestic ￿rms bene￿t from this. This superior knowledge leads to an increase in ￿rm productivity, which translates
into higher earnings for all. See, for example, Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).
43This e⁄ect is similar to Monge-Naranjo (2007) where the transfer of skills fom MNEs materialize in a new sector
of ￿rms, not in the pre-existing sector of ￿rms.
19two countries is in the distribution of newborns. In particular, the Foreign country has a larger
knowledge support. This translates into relatively greater endowment of more knowledgeable agents
in the Foreign country.44
1a: Welfare under autarky 1b: Wages under autarky
Figure 1: Comparison of the Home and Foreign economy under autarky
The less knowledgeable agents are relatively scarce in the Foreign country and hence, are better
o⁄ compared to their Home counterparts. But the most knowledgeable agents at Home are better
o⁄compared to their foreign counterparts. The latter are low-level managers in the Foreign country,
who have to compete against managers with superior knowledge. The relative abundance of less
knowledgeable agents at Home translates into a Home wage schedule that lies below the Foreign
wage schedule. Thus, labour is cheap at Home and this motivates the formation of MNEs.
Next, we allow the countries to integrate. First, we consider a case where learning is slow.
Keeping the learning distribution unchanged, this means a higher ￿: We choose ￿ = 0:8: In Figure 2,
we compare the two steady-states: autarky and integration. In Figure 2a, we see that in the steady-
state under integration (New S.S.), the welfare of individuals who are born with less knowledge
is higher while the welfare of those with high levels knowledge is lower. Figure 2b indicates that
the incumbent managers have a worse match; thus every incumbent manager is now producing
less. This is con￿rmed in Figure 2d. This implies lower revenue. But the e⁄ect on pro￿ts, which
determines the managers￿welfare, also depends on the wage bill.
From the discussion in the previous section, we know that, the e⁄ect of integration on wages
depends on the relative strength of the labour demand e⁄ect and the learning e⁄ect. For a slow
learning rate, the former e⁄ect dominates and the wage schedule shifts up, thereby lowering the
pro￿ts of incumbent managers. This is shown in Figure 2c. This explains the reduction in welfare of
the more knowledgeable agents. Notice that we restrict our attention to the agents who are born in
44If both ￿H and ￿F are truncated exponentials with the same parameter and kH < kF; then ￿F ￿rst-order
stochastic dominates ￿H:
20[k;kH]: Although, in the new steady state, there are Home agents with knowledge in [kH;kF]; but
at the time of birth, these agents still draw their knowledge from the Home newborn distribution,
which does not change with integration. Home agents attain knowledge in [kH;kF] through learning,
not through birth.
2a : Welfare 2b : Inverse Matching Function
2c : Current Earnings 2d : Output
Figure 2 : Change in the values of di⁄erent variables due to integration (￿ = 0:8)
In the above scenario, we compared the steady-state under autarky and integration. To compute
the welfare gains from the integration policy, however, one should compare the autarky steady-state
equilibrium with the integrated equilibrium in the period just after the policy is put in place. With
the policy, there is no immediate change in the knowledge distribution. Consequently, the matches
do not change. However, as soon as the policy is implemented, the agents￿expectations about the
future knowledge distribution change. The agents know that when the Home country opens up,
the matches will be determined by the integrated knowledge distribution. Therefore, the matches
will change, and by changing the way agents learn, will a⁄ect the distribution. The knowledge
21distribution will evolve slowly, until it reaches the new steady-state.
Figure 3: Evolution of the Knowledge Distribution
The above ￿gure shows the transition of the integrated knowledge distribution from the time
the Home country integrates until it reaches the new steay-state. The intial distribution is simply
the sum of the Home and Foreign steady-state distributions. There are three discontinuities in the
initial distribution. The ￿rst one occurs at k￿
A:45 The second one occurs at kH: This is due to the
fact that no Home agents are born to the right of kH: The third discontinuity is at the Foreign
threshold. In the new steady-state, the discontinuities occur at k￿
I and kH:
The agents know exactly how the distribution is going to evolve and hence, they know the
wages and pro￿ts at each period during the transition. This, in turn, allows them to compute their
welfare in every period. It can be shown that for ￿ = 0:8; not only are there losers in the new
steady-state, but the policy itself creates losers.
The outcomes change if we increase the learning rate. The results are displayed in Figure 4
for ￿ = 0:5. Now, the learning e⁄ect dominates the labour demand e⁄ect, thereby lowering the
wage schedule. Although the output of the incumbent Home managers fall (Figure 4d) due to a
worsening of their matches (Figure 4b), the wage bill decreases by so much, that it outweighs the
fall in revenue, resulting in higher pro￿ts. This makes the home managers better-o⁄. The less
knowledgeable agents are better-o⁄ too, as the increase in their continuation value outweighs the
decline in wages. This is true both in the new steady-state, as well as, in the period following the
45There is always a discontinuity at the threshold. In a small interval to the left of the threshold (where all agents
are workers) there is both an in￿ ow of workers and an out￿ ow of workers. But in a small interval just to the right of
the threshold, there is only in￿ ow and no out￿ ow (since managers do not learn).
22policy implementation.46
4a: Welfare 4b: Inverse Matching Function
4c: Current Earnings 4d: Output
Figure 4: Change in the values of di⁄erent variables due to integration (￿ = 0:5)
Finally, Figure 5 shows the results for ￿ = 0:4. For this rate of learning, k￿
I exceeds kH: This
situation corresponds to Case I from the last section. Integration makes every agent better-o⁄.
However, every newborn agent is a worker in the integrated economy. Under this situation, none
of the incumbent Home managers operate.
The above plots suggest that the incumbent ￿rms experience a decline in output, irrespective
of whether agents are learning at a slow or a fast rate. According to Aitken and Harrison (1999),
foreign direct investment was accompanied by a decline in the productivity of domestically owned
￿rms in Venezuela. This decline, the authors report, is due to a contraction in output of domestic
￿rms due to the "market stealing e⁄ects" of foreign ￿rms.47 In our model, the output reduction
46It can be shown that the evolution of the value function during the transition is monotonic. This implies that
for ￿ = 0:5; agents are better-o⁄ compared to autarky at every period during the transition.
47With ￿xed costs of production, foreign ￿rms with lower marginal costs can expand their output at the expense
of domestic ￿rms.
23is a natural consequence of complementarity in production and learning. Under integration, the
most knowledgeable workers are hired by the MNEs leaving less knowledgeable workers to work for
incumbent domestic ￿rms. We call this the "worker stealing e⁄ect".48 In spite of this, the Home
managers are actually better o⁄ if learning is fast enough.
5a: Welfare 5b: Current Earnings
Figure 5: Change in the values of di⁄erent variables due to integration (￿ = 0:4)
Evidence regarding the impact of multinational production on wages has been mixed. Aitken et
al (1996) report that in Mexico and Venezuela, the wage spillover to domestic ￿rms is negative and
signi￿cant. On the other hand, Lipsey and Sj￿holm (2004) ￿nd signi￿cant positive wage spillovers
to domestic ￿rms in Indonesia. In the previous section, we saw that if learning is fast enough, the
wage schedule shifts down. This result, however, is not inconsistent with the ￿nding of positive
wage spillovers. In the above mentioned studies, the wage is computed as the average of wages paid
by all domestic ￿rms. The average wage depends not only on the level of the wage schedule but
also on the distribution of agents. With integration, as workers get matched with better managers
and learn more, the mass shifts to the right. Therefore, a lowering of the wage schedule and a
higher average wage can go hand in hand.
The numerical results of this section con￿rm the analytical results obtained in the last section.
When learning is slow, integration creates winners and losers. In the above example, the more
knowledgeable agents in the host country lose. But if agents learn fast enough, integration can
make every agent better-o⁄. In this case, there is a decline in the output of the incumbent ￿rms,
as well as, the wages of the workers. Therefore, current wages or productivity could be misleading
when it comes to assessing welfare gains from integration.
48I am grateful to Thomas Chaney for suggesting this term.
245.2 Earnings Dynamics
Although the economy is not growing in the steady-state, individual earnings grow over the lifetime.
Figure 6 displays some of the dynamic aspects of the model for ￿ = 0:5.
Figure 6a plots the earnings path of the worker with median knowledge. We assume that the
knowledge that he acquires every period is the expected knowledge that an agent with his level of
knowledge would acquire. In the ￿gure, the agent works for the ￿rst three periods and manages
from the fourth period onwards.49 Under integration, a lower wage in the ￿rst two periods is more
than compensated by the increase in future pro￿ts. The lifetime earnings schedule under integration
is also steeper than that under autarky. As long as the agent is a worker, under integration, he gets
matched with more knowledgeable managers. This implies that the relative jump in wages every
period is greater under integration.
6a: Evolution of earnings over the lifetime 6b: Distribution of knowledge at death
Figure 6: Dynamics of knowledge and earnings
Figure 6b provides an explanation for the greater jump in future pro￿ts. It shows the distrib-
ution of knowledge of the median agent at the time of death.50 With integration, the distribution
shifts to the right. On average, the agent becomes a more knowledgeable manager compared to
autarky and hence, his expected pro￿ts are higher.
5.3 Inequality
By generating a non-degenerate consumption distribution, the model also allows us to talk about
inequality. Figure 7 examines the e⁄ect of integration for inequality. ￿ is set to 0.5.
49Note that once the agent becomes a manager, his earnings do not change because he stops learning.
50Given the parameter values, the probability of the agent living for more than 5 periods is extremely small. Here
we are assuming that the agent dies after 5 periods.
257a: Consumption distributions 7b: Change in Gini coe¢ cients
Figure 7: Income inequality
Figure 7a plots the Home consumption distributions under autarky and integration. With
integration, the distribution stretches out and more mass is shifted to the upper tail (The maximum
consumption under autarky is 2.05, while that under integration is 2.77). From the ￿gure, it is
not evident whether inequality goes up or down. Figure 7b plots the percentage change in the gini
coe¢ cient as the Home country integrates, for di⁄erent values of ￿. From the ￿gure we see that for
￿ = 0:5; inequality rises by about 40%. But this rise in inequality is not a general phenomenon.
For higher values of ￿; integration actually leads to a reduction in inequality. For lower values
of ￿; however, integration increases inequality. Moreover, there is a monotonic relation between
inequality and the the rate of learning.
Integration, when agents learn fast enough, gives an advantage to those who are born with a
lot of knowledge, but not enough to become managers. These are the agents who work for the
most knowledgeable Foreign managers, learn and in turn, become knowledgeable managers in the
future. Agents who are born with very little knowledge are matched to the less knowledgeable
incumbent Home managers and accordingly, learn less. Learning ampli￿es the initial inequality in
the economy.
5.4 Pattern of MNE activity
Our model also allows us to analyze the pattern of MNE activity. In the previous section, we had
mentioned that integration leads to the creation of a new class of Home managers, who are as pro-
ductive as their counterparts in the Foreign country. This can be seen in Figure 8. Figure 8a shows
the newborn distribution of the two countries. Under autarky, the support of the Home knowledge
distribution coincides with that of the Home newborn distribution and hence, the knowledge of the
best manager is bounded above by kH: Figure 8b plots the supply and demand for managers at
Home in the integrated steady-state equilibrium. The supply of managers is simply the part of the
26knowledge distribution that lies above the threshold. Recall that the upper bound of the Home
newborn distribution is 1.5. Therefore, there is a discrete drop in the density of newborn agents to
the right of 1.5 and this explains the discontinuity at 1.5. The demand for managers is obtained
by looking at the number of workers of each type and the demand for manager per worker.51
Figure 8b suggests that, in the integrated steady-state equilibrium, there are Home managers
who are as knowledgeable as their Foreign counterparts. At the same time, the supply of Home
managers is not su¢ cient to meet the demand. In the new equilibrium, some of the Foreign
managers hire Home workers and hence, Home ￿rms and Foreign MNEs operate together.52 Figure
8b also throws light on the pattern of multinational activity. The supply of Home managers falls
short of demand, and there are no Home MNEs in this equilibrium.53 Moreover, most of the
MNEs operating at Home are the best Foreign ￿rms. Thus, the MNEs, on average, are bigger and
more productive than the Home ￿rms. PAM implies that a worker in a MNE, on average, is more
knowledgeable than a worker in a Home ￿rm. Therefore, the former employees of MNEs are also
more productive managers.
8a: Newborn distributions 8b: Supply and demand for managers
Figure 8: MNE activity at Home
Alternate newborn distributions : The pattern of MNE activity described above depends
on the newborn distributions in the two countries. In the above example, we had assumed that the
Foreign newborn distribution dominates the Home newborn distribution in the sense of ￿rst-order
stochastic dominance. The pattern changes if we relax this assumption. Figure 9 considers a case
where the Foreign newborn distribution has relatively more less knowledgeable people relative to
the Home newborn distribution.
51The demand for manager per worker is simply the reciprocal of the span of control. This is a feature of the span
of control being only a knowledge of the worker.
52See Markusen and Venables (1999) for the case where FDI leads to the development of local industry but is
driven out as the industry develops enough.
53Here we follow AGR in assuming that, a manager will hire workers in the other country only if he strictly prefers
doing so.
279a: Newborn distributions 9b: Supply and demand for managers
Figure 9: MNE activity at Home (di⁄erent degree of inequality)
Figure 9a shows the two newborn distributions, where the kF is still greater than kH. The
pattern of MNE activity that results from such distributions is shown in Figure 9b. The supply
of less knowledgeable Home managers exceeds demand, while the converse is true for the more
knowledgeable Home managers. In the integrated equilibrium, we witness multinational activity
in both directions, with the smaller MNEs originating in the Home country and the larger MNEs
originating in the Foreign country.54
In a survey of ￿rms in Ghana, G￿rg and Strobl (2005) investigate whether knowledge spillovers
occur through worker mobility. They combine information on whether or not the owner of a do-
mestic ￿rm had previous experience in a multinational with information on ￿rm-level productivity.
They show that ￿rms which are run by owners who worked for foreign multinationals in the same
industry immediately prior to opening their ￿rm are more productive than other domestic ￿rms.
Using data on Danish ￿rms, Malchow-Młller et al (2006) show that previous experience in foreign-
owned ￿rms increases a worker￿ s current wage. Both pieces of evidence are consistent with our
model.
Therefore, in our model, domestic ￿rms and MNEs coexist. On average, the foreign MNEs tend
to be bigger and more productive. Our model also generates multinational activities by ￿rms in
both countries.
6 Gains from Globalization
In this section, we measure the gains from bilateral integration. We perform the following coun-
terfactual exercise. First, we compute the GDP and associated welfare of the host country under
autarky. Then we allow it to integrate with a foreign country which has relatively more knowledge-
54For a model with two-way FDI ￿ ows, see Nocke and Yeaple (2008). In their model, these FDI ￿ ows take the form
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
28able agents. This leads to the formation of international teams. By looking at the resulting GDP
and welfare in the host country and comparing it with the autarky levels, we get an estimate of the
gains from integration. In order to carry out this exercise, we need the values for the technology
parameters ￿;￿; the parameter of the exponential distribution ￿; the probability of death ￿; and
the upper bound k:
The most di¢ cult parameter to obtain is ￿: To our knowledge, there is no paper which tries to
understand how workers learn within ￿rms. In order to come up with an estimate for ￿; we proceed
as follows. In an in￿ uential paper, Topel (1991) showed that ten years of current job seniority raises
the wage of the typical male worker in the United States by over 25 percent. This is an estimate
of what the typical worker would lose if his job were to end exogenously. One can consider this as
evidence that workers accumulate ￿rm-speci￿c knowledge and it gives an indication of the speed
with which workers learn. We show in the Appendix that this translates into the unit of time being
17 years.
We also choose the exit rate for ￿rms. The probability of exit for ￿rms, however, varies widely in
the U.S. economy. Larger and older ￿rms have a smaller probability of exit compared to smaller and
new ￿rms (Dunne et al (1989)). In this paper, we assume that all ￿rms face the same probability
of exit. Dunne et al (1988) report an average exit rate that varies between 0.3 and 0.39 between
each pair of census years over the period 1963-82,55 where the gap between consecutive census years
is 5 years. We take the average exit rate in 5 years to be 0.34. ￿; which is the probability of exit
of a ￿rm over 17 years, turns out to be approximately 0.7.
We choose the three parameters ￿;￿;￿ to match three key moments of the U.S. wage distri-
bution. A measure of inequality that is quite popular in the literature, is the ratio of the 90th
percentile to the 10th percentile (Juhn et al). We ignore the observations at the tails and instead
choose a di⁄erent measure : the ratio of the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile. This ratio was
around 2.5 in 2007 (Source : U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). This ratio is a measure of dispersion
of the wage distribution. We also choose the ratio of the mean to the median, which can be inter-
preted as a measure of skewness. In 2007, this value was around 1.25. The third moment that we
match is the ratio of the median wage of managers to the overall median wage. The corresponding
value in 2007 was about 2.6. The implied values of the parameters are shown in the following table.
Parameter ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Value 0.7 1.9 0.55 1.4
Table 1: The values of the parameters
We assume that the parameter values in Table 1 are common to all countries. This means that
there are other country-speci￿c factors that generate di⁄erent levels of output and factor prices.
55This excludes the smallest ￿rms.
29The country-speci￿c parameters in this model are k and ￿: We interpret k (and hence the support
of the knowledge distribution) as being determined by the education policies of the government
and the general research environment while ￿ is a measure of business risk. These two, combined
with technology, result in ￿nal output. In order to calibrate these two parameters for the di⁄erent
countries, we proceed as follows.
We divide the countries into groups based on their autarky per capita GDP relative to the U.S.
Since those ￿gures are not available, we choose the relative per capita GDP of these countries in
1970.56 The ￿gures for per capita GDP have been obtained from the Penn World Tables.
We assume that every country within an income group faces the same ￿: We also assume that
the richest country in an income group has the same k (and hence the same distribution) as the
average country belonging to the income group just above it. The di⁄erence in income between
these two countries arises due to a di⁄erence in ￿: Therefore, once we know the average k of an
income group, we can ￿gure out the ￿ for the next income group. Within an income group, the
di⁄erence in income arises only due to a di⁄erence in k: Once we know the k of the richest country
in a group, we can compute the average k for that group. We repeat this procedure for every group.
Our classi￿cation scheme, and ￿ and k of the average country in each income group, is shown in
Table 2.
Groups Basis of classi￿cation57 Average p.c. GDP Average k ￿
High-income Above 60% 1 (normalized) 2 0.7
Middle-income (high) 40%-60% 0.64 1.85 0.5
Middle-income (low) 20%-40% 0.35 1.5 0.38
Low-income (high) 10%-20% 0.19 1.21 0.29
Low-income (low) Below 10% 0.07 1.05 0.18
Table 2: Country speci￿c parameters
Assumption 1c imposes some restriction on the support of the knowledge distribution. For the
High-income countries, we ￿x k at 2. We also normalize the average per capita GDP of the High-
income countries to 1. This gives a value of ￿ for this group equal to 0.7. Following the procedure
outlined above, we back out the k and ￿ for the other income groups.
Once we have all the parameters, we perform the following exercise. We let the average country
56Our choice of 1970 as the base year is due to the fact that the Bretton Woods collapsed in 1971. During the entire
post-war period, until the fall of the Bretton Woods, most of the countries had a system of ￿xed exchange rates.
Consequently, there was a lot of capital control in place which limited cross border investment, both in ￿nancial
assets and FDI (Irwin(2002)). This can be judged from the fact that FDI in￿ ows in 1970-73 was around 1.5% of
what it was in 1998-2001 (UNCTAD). Of course, world GDP has also been growing during this time. But the growth
in real FDI in￿ ows at 17.7% per year far outstripped the corresponding growth in real GDP of 2.5% per year during
the period 1985-99.
57per capita GDP as percentage of U.S. per capita GDP.
30from each of the income groups integrate with the average High-income country. The gains from
integration are displayed in Table 3.
Percentage change in Percentage change
GNI GDP Welfare due to learning
Middle-income (high) 1.6% 10.9% 2% 98%
Middle-income (low) 5.7% 57.1% 13.2% 88%
Low-income (high) 10.2% 157.9% 32.1% 83%
Low-income (low) 22.2% 300% 42.9% 74%
Table 3: Percentage change in variables due to integration
Under autarky, GDP and Gross National Income (GNI) are the same. That is not true anymore
under integration. Table 3 suggests that the gain in per capita GDP is much larger than the gain
in per capita GNI. Under integration, the workers in the host country are matched with better
managers. Since output per worker depends on the knowledge of the manager he is matched with,
integration has a signi￿cant impact on output. The e⁄ect on GNI is much more muted. As the
analysis in the last section suggests, higher wages are associated with lower pro￿ts and vice versa.
The positive e⁄ect on welfare, however, is much more pronounced. Under integration, the Home
agents learn from more knowledgeable managers and this raises the present value of their income,
even when current wages go down. These welfare gains range from a low 2% for the relatively rich
Middle-income countries to almost 43% for the poorest countries of the world.
The gains from integration can be decomposed into two parts. There are gains from more
e¢ cient allocation of managers to workers. These gains are purely static in nature. On top of this,
there are dynamic gains because learning changes the knowledge distribution. The last column in
Table 3 shows the percentage of gains that can be attributed to learning. This percentage is higher
for the richer developing countries. The Middle-income countries are more similar to the High-
income countries in terms of their knowledge distribution. As a result, the gains from re-allocation
are quite small.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a dynamic, general equilibrium model to study the e⁄ects of knowledge
di⁄usion from MNEs on host countries. In our model, agents are heterogenous in terms of the
knowledge they possess. Every period, an agent chooses his occupation (worker or manager) and
with whom he wants to work. We assume that workers learn on the job. Both the production
and the learning technology exhibit complementarity. We show that the complementarity of the
production and learning technologies results in positive assortative matching (PAM). In the sta-
tionary equilibrium, every agent born above a knowledge threshold is a manager. Agents born
31with knowledge less than the threshold, work for more knowledgeable managers and learn. Some
of them eventually become managers.
We allow the Home country to integrate with a Foreign country, where the Foreign country
has relatively more knowledgeable agents. By integration, we mean that managers are able to
form international teams. First, we consider a version of the model where agents do not learn.
Integration leads to a re-adjustment among host country managers whereby the least knowledgeable
among them exit, whereas among those who persist as managers, some are now matched with less
knowledgeable workers. Under this situation, we show that integration can never generate Pareto
gains for the Home country.
In the presence of learning, there are two e⁄ects that determine wages: the labour demand
e⁄ect and the learning e⁄ect. The former tends to raise the wage schedule while the latter tends
to lower it. We show that if learning is fast enough, the learning e⁄ect dominates and the wage
schedule shifts down enough so as to make the incumbent managers better-o⁄. At the same time,
the continuation value of the workers outweighs the decline in their current wages, thereby making
them better-o⁄. We believe that this is a novel mechanism through which integration, in the
presence of learning, can lead to Pareto improvement for the Home country.
In the quantitative section, we calibrate the closed-economy model to match key moments of
the U.S. wage distribution. Then we perform the following counterfactual: How much do the
developing countries gain by moving from autarky to frictionless integration with the average de-
veloped country? Using parameter values obtained from the calibration, we ￿nd welfare gains that
range from two percent for the richest middle-income countries to almost forty-three percent for
the poorest countries.
To conclude, we do not have a good understanding of, for example, how knowledge evolves and
the distribution of skills change as a country gradually integrates with the rest of the world. We
believe that our paper is a step in that direction. Our quantitative analysis, although performed
under some strong assumptions about the knowledge distribution of newborns, suggests that the
dynamic gains from integration are non-negligible, especially for the poorest countries of the world.
We believe that introducing growth in our model will generate new insights about the relation
between growth and openness and we leave that for future work.
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35Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let C be the space of bounded, continuous functions de￿ned on R. De￿ne
the operator T(VM(:;:)) as
T(VM(y;wt+1)) = sup
x2[k;y]
f￿f(y)n(x) ￿ wt(x)n(x)g + (1 ￿ ￿)max[VW(y;wt+1);VM(y;wt+1)]
We need to show that T preserves continuity and boundedness. Continuity follows from the
fact that f(:);n(:) and wt(:) are continuous and so is the max operator. To prove boundedness of
T; we note that f(y) and n(x) are continuous functions de￿ned on the compact set [k;y] and hence
must be bounded. Furthermore, wt(x) ￿ ￿f(y) (otherwise pro￿ts will be negative) and hence wt(x)
must be bounded too. Hence T preserves continuity and boundedness, i.e. T(VM(:)) : C ! C .
It￿ s easy to see that if V 1
M(y;w) ￿ V 2
M(y;w) for all x, then T(V 1
M(y;w)) ￿ T(V 2
M(y;w)): Fur-
thermore, T(VM(y;w) + a) ￿ T(VM(y;w)) + (1 ￿ ￿)a: Since (1 ￿ ￿) < 1, T satis￿es Blackwell￿ s
Su¢ ciency Conditions for a contraction and hence, by the Contraction Mapping Theorem, there
exists a unique, ￿xed point of VM(y;w):
Let VW(y;x0) and VM(y;x0) be increasing in y. Then max[VW(y;x0);VM(y;x0)] is also increasing
in y. Furthermore, f0(y) > 0: Combining, we get
T(VW(y1)) > T(VW(y2))
if y1 > y2: That is, the contraction is increasing in y. Hence it must be the case that the ￿xed
point is increasing in y too, i.e.VW(y;x) is increasing in y.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let C be the space of bounded, continuous functions de￿ned on R: De￿ne
the operator T(VW(:)) as




It can be shown that the contraction de￿ned above preserves boundedness and continuity and
therefore T(VW(:)) : C ! C. , It is relatively simple to check that Blackwell￿ s Su¢ ciency Conditions
are satis￿ed too. Hence, VW(x;w) exists.
Let VW(x;w0) and VM(x;w0) be increasing in x. De￿ne
h(x) = max[VW(x;w);VM(x;w)]
Then h(x) is an increasing function of x. Pick x1 and x2 such that x1 > x2: As we prove later,










The above inequality, combined with w0
t(x) > 0; implies that
T(VW(x1;w)) > T(VW(x2;w))
i.e. the contraction is increasing in x. Hence it must be the case that the ￿xed point is increasing
in x too, i.e. VW(x) is increasing in x.















Now L(k) = ￿
R k
k n(m￿1(s)) (s)ds < 0 while L(k) =
R k
k  (s)ds > 0: Moreover,
@L(k￿)
@k￿ =
[1 + n(m￿1(k￿)] (k￿) > 0: Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, 9 a unique k￿ such that
L(k￿) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose P is monotone, has the Feller property and satis￿es a mixing
condition. Then P has a unique, invariant probability measure ￿￿:(Stokey, Lucas with Prescott,
1989). De￿ne the operator T as
(Tf)(k) =
Z
f(k0)P(k;dk0); all k 2 [k;k]
where f : [k;k] ! R is a bounded function. If f is non-decreasing, then the ￿rst-order stochastic
dominance property of the learning distribution implies that Tf is also non-decreasing. (Monotone
Property) It is straight-forward to verify that if f is bounded and continuous, then the same holds
for Tf; i.e. T : C(k) ! C(k) (Feller Property). The mixing condition requires that 9c 2 [k;k];
￿ > 0 and N ￿ 1 such that PN(k;[c;k]) ￿ ￿ and PN([k;c];k]) ￿ ￿: Choose k0 2 [k;k]: De￿ne
￿1 =
R
[k0;k] d￿N(s) and ￿2 =
R
[k;k0] d￿N(s): By the assumption on ￿N(:); we know that both these
objects are greater than 0. Choose ￿ = ￿ minf￿1;￿2g and N = 1: Then P(k;[k0;k]) ￿ ￿ and
P([k;k0];k]) ￿ ￿: Therefore all the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the invariant
distribution are satis￿ed.
37Deriving the equilibrium conditions. Since k￿ must be indi⁄erent between being a worker
and a manager, we must have VW(k￿;w) = VM(k￿;w): Furthermore, for k￿ to be the threshold, it
must be the case that k can not hire k￿ + ￿ and be strictly better-o⁄. If k￿ + ￿ is a manager, he
earns VM(k￿ + ￿): In order to hire k￿ + ￿, the manager has to pay him a wage such that he is just
indi⁄erent between being a manager and a worker. Let this wage be !: ! should satisfy
! + (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
VM(k)dL(kj;k￿ + ￿;k) = VM(k￿ + ￿)
Therefore, period pro￿t of k if he hires k￿ + ￿ is given by
￿k￿+￿(k)=(￿f(k) ￿ !)n(k￿ + ￿)
=￿f(k)n(k￿ + ￿) ￿ n(k￿ + ￿)(VM(k￿ + ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
VM(k)dL(kj;k￿ + ￿;k))











=￿f(k)n0(k￿) ￿ n(k￿)(V 0





￿n0(k￿)(VM(k￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(
Z
VM(k)dL(kj;k￿;k)))
From the manager￿ s pro￿t-maximizing problem, we have
￿f(k)n0(k￿) = w0(k￿)n(k￿) + w(k￿)n0(k￿)
Also, for a worker with knowledge k￿;
VW(k￿) = w(k￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(
Z
VM(k)dL(kjk￿;k))
Since k￿ is the threshold, max[VW(k);VM(k)] = VM(k) 8k ￿ k￿: Di⁄erentiating w.r.t. k￿
V 0










=w0(k￿) ￿ (V 0
M(k￿) ￿ V 0
W(k￿) + w0(k￿))
=V 0
W(k￿) ￿ V 0
M(k￿)
where we use the fact that VW(k￿;w) = VM(k￿;w): Hence lim
￿!0
@￿k￿+￿(k)
@￿ < 0 implies that
V 0
W(k￿) < V 0
M(k￿)
Proof of Proposition 2. We shall prove this proposition in a slightly di⁄erent way. First we
prove the existence of the threshold equilibrium, assuming that the equilibium is unique. Then we
show that the su￿cient condition for existence is also su¢ cient for uniqueness.
By assuming uniqueness, we are basically assuming that the set of workers and managers has to
be connected in equilibrium (See AGR). Given that there exists a unique market-clearing threshold


























where the second line follows from the manager￿ s pro￿t-maximization condition. Therefore, for
k￿ to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that
(￿f(k) ￿ w(k￿))n0(k￿)
n(k￿)












39Since w(k￿) > 0; for the above inequality to hold, we need to ￿nd the conditions under which
f(k)n0(k￿)
n(k￿) ￿ f0(k￿)n(k); or f(k)n0(k￿) ￿ f0(k￿)n(k); since n(k￿) ￿ 1:
But f(k)n0(k￿) ￿ f(k)n0(k) (* n00(:) ￿ 0) and f0(k￿)n(k) ￿ f0(k)n(k) (* n00(:) ￿ 0). Hence it
follows that
f(k)n0(k￿) ￿ f(k)n0(k) ￿ f0(k)n(k) ￿ f0(k￿)n(k)
where the inequality in the middle follows from Assumption 3. Thus for ￿ = 1; the conditon on




VM(k)dL(kjk￿;k)); since this term is positive by assumption on the learning technology. Now
this term is endogeneous and it depends on the invariant distribution, which in turn is determined
by the learning distribution. This term is bounded above, since the domain is compact. Hence by






De￿ne ￿￿ as the value of ￿ that satis￿es
f(k)n0(k) + (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ = f0(k)n(k)
This can be re-written as
n0(k)
n(k)










f(k) implies that ￿￿ < 1: Hence 8￿ 2 [￿￿;1]; we have
f(k)n0(k) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ f0(k)n(k)
Thus




VM(k)dL(kjk￿;k))￿f(k)n0(k) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿f0(k)n(k)
￿f0(k￿)n(k)
￿ ￿ 1 implies that f0(k￿)n(k) ￿ 1
￿f0(k￿)n(k). Therefore








40This completes our proof about the existence of equilibrium. As mentioned before, showing
uniqueness entails showing that the set of workers and managers is connected. Suppose not. WLOG
let￿ s assume that the knowledge distribution has the following partition - ([1;k1];[k1;k2];[k2;k3];[k3;k4]):
Workers in [k;k1] work for managers in [k1;k2] while workers in [k2;k3] work for managers in [k3;k4]:
For this to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that k2 must be indi⁄erent between being a worker
and a manager. In other words, a deviation involving k3 hiring k2￿￿ should not make both k3 and
k2￿￿ better o⁄. Using a similar logic as developed above, one can show that that the condition for
equilibrium is V 0
W(k2) > V 0




f(k) ; then for ￿ high enough,
this conditon will always be violated. Therefore, an allocation with disconnected sets of workers
and managers can never be sustained as an equilibrium implying that the only equilibrium is the
threshold equilibrium.
To prove e¢ ciency, we follow Legros and Newman (2002). Let us de￿ne ￿(k) as the value that
the social planner attaches to knowledge k: In this set-up, when a manager with knowledge y and
workers with knowledge x get together, they produce f(y)n(x) + n(x)[￿(E(x0jx;y) ￿ ￿(x)]; where
E(x0jx;y) is the expected knowledge that workers acquire. Let us consider the no-learning case
￿rst. In the absence of learning, the total value produced is simply f(y)n(x): It is simple to show
that complementarity implies that the planner uses Positive Assortative Matching. We need to
show that the planner maximizes value from threshold matching. We prove this by contradiction.
Supppose there￿ s segregation, i.e. the set of workers and managers is disconnected. In this case,
one can always ￿nd k1 < k2 < k2 +￿ < k3 such that k1 works for k2 and k2 +￿ works for k3(￿); i.e.
k2 is a threshold. Since the planner is maximizing value, this implies that the planner can not do
better my switching the team members, i.e. it must not be the case that
f(k2 + ￿)n(k1) + f(k3(￿))n(k2) > f(k2)n(k1) + f(k3(￿))n(k2 + ￿)
Re-arranging, we have
n(k1)(f(k2 + ￿) ￿ f(k2)) > f(k3(￿))(n(k2 + ￿) ￿ n(k2))
Dividing by ￿ and taking limit as ￿ ! 0; we get
n(k1)f0(k2) > f(k3(0))n0(k2)
In the above inequality, the LHS = n(k1)f0(k2) > n(k)f0(k2) ￿ n(k)f0(k) and the RHS =
f(k3(0))n0(k2) < f(k)n0(k2) ￿ f(k)n0(k1): Since n(k)f0(k) > f(k)n0(k); the above inequality holds.
But then we get a contradiction. Hence the social planner maximizes value by threshold matching.
Now we introduce learning. Larger is ￿, smaller is the value of learning. Since the above inequality
holds for ￿ = 1; by continuity, it will also hold for ￿ large enough. Consequently, for ￿ large enough,
41threshold matching is also e¢ cient.
Proof of Lemma 4. Since y is indi⁄erent along e wNL(x;y); for any x1 and x2 we must have
￿f(y)n(x1) ￿ e wNL(x1)n(x1) = ￿f(y)n(x2) ￿ e wNL(x2)n(x2): Letting x2 = x1 + h and re-arranging,
we have e wNL(x1 + h)n(x1 + h) ￿ e wNL(x1)n(x1) = ￿f(y)n(x1 + h) ￿ ￿f(y)n(x1): Dividing by h
and taking the limit as h ! 0; we get e w0
NL(x1) =
n0(x1)(￿f(y)￿w(x1))
n(x1) : Since ￿f(y) ￿ w(x1) ￿ 0 and
n0(x1) > 0; the RHS￿ 0: Moreover, since the derivative is well-de￿ned, it follows that e wNL(x1) is
also continuous at x1: Since x1 was chosen randomly, the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let us denote the continuation value of x; when he works for y; by
C(x;y). Conituity of the value functions implies that C(x;y) is continuous too. We shall prove
this lemma by contradiction. Suppose that 9 x0 and y0 such that V (x0) = e VW(x0;y0) but e w(x0;y0) <
max
y
e w(x0;y) = e w(x0;y) (say). Then, given the properties of e w(x;y); we can have either of the
following situations - (a) Suppose y0 < y: At x = x0; e w(x0;y0) < e w(x0;y): Moreover, from the
learning technology we know that the continuation value of x0 is higher if he works for y rather
than y0: But then e VW(x0;y0) < e VW(x0;y): Hence V (x0) 6= e VW(x0;y0) and we get a contradiction.
(b) Suppose y0 > y: Then either 9 x00 < x0 and y00 < y such that w(x00) = e w(x00;y00) < e w(x00;y)
in which case we are back to case (a). Or, 9 x00 < x0 such that there￿ s a discontinuity in w(x)
at x = x00: In particular, lim
￿!0
w(x00 ￿ ￿) = lim
￿!0
e w(x00 ￿ ￿;y) > e w(x00;y0) = w(x00): Since V (x) must
be continuous at x00; lim
￿!0
C(x00 ￿ ￿;y) < C(x00;y0): Now consider the sequence x ! x00; (x < x00):
Continuity of e w(:) implies that lim
￿!0
e w(x00￿￿;y0) = e w(x00;y0) and lim
￿!0
e w(x00￿￿;y) = e w(x00;y): Similarly,
continuity of C(:) implies that lim
￿!0
C(x00 ￿ ￿;y0) = C(x00;y0) and lim
￿!0
C(x00 ￿ ￿;y) = C(x00;y): Now
lim
￿!0











e VW(x00￿￿;y): But then, as ￿ ! 0; argmaxe VW(x00￿￿;y) 6= y
and we get a contradiction. The reverse implication can be proved in a similar fashion.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let the number of people being born every period be normalized to 1.
Cohort t at time t are all newborns. All agents in [k;k￿




k ￿H(k)dk: A worker with knowledge k demands 1
n(k) managers. Therefore, the total demand





n(k;￿)dk:The supply of cohort t managers is simply the
measure of agents in [k￿




￿H(k)dk: Let us consider the distribution of
cohort t ￿ 1 agents at time t. A fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of every type of agent in [k;k￿
A] survive in period t.
Out of the ones that survive, a fraction ￿ of every type of agent do not learn and remain where they






a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the cohort t ￿ 1 managers in [k￿




k ￿H(k)dk agents move into this interval from [k;k￿
A]: They are the
cohort t ￿ 1 agents who were workers in period t ￿ 1 but become managers in period t: Therefore,







k ￿H(k)dk]: The supply and
42demand for managers in other cohorts can be obtained in a similar fashion. Adding up the demand
for managers and the supply of managers in each cohort, we get
Demand for managers =
1







Supply of managers =
1
￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))









In equilibrium, supply must equal demand. Equating the above two expressions and after a bit














In order to derive the properties of k￿
A; we use the Implicit Function Theorem. Di⁄erentiating































Since the LHS is positive while the RHS is negative,
@k￿
A




















































43Proof of Lemma 6. Let G f.o.s.d. H. Let g and h be the corresponding densities. Also, let
￿(k) be the demand for manager per worker, where the worker has knowledge k. Since the span
of control is only a function of the worker￿ s knowledge, a worker with knowledge k works in a ￿rm
of size n(k). Hence ￿(k) is simply the reciprocal of n(k). Therefore ￿0(k) < 0 (this follows from
n0(k) > 0). Also, let k￿ be the threshold under H:
We shall prove the lemma by contradiction. Let k￿ also be the threshold for G. We can





k ￿(k)h(k)dk = demand for managers under H: But the supply of
managers under G = 1 ￿ G(k￿) > 1 ￿ H(k￿) =supply of managers under H: Hence at k￿; there￿ s
an excess supply of managers under G: This means that the threshold for G must be greater than
k￿: (ii) There are n intervals Ai ￿ [k;k￿]; i = 1;:::::n such that
g(k)>h(k)8k 2 Ai;8i
g(k)<h(k) otherwise
: Rank the Ais such that Ai < Aj ) maxAi < minAj: We proceed as follows - We know that
k < minA1 = a1(say) (otherwise H would f.o.s.d. G). Let B = [k;a1]: Then it must be the case













Re-arranging the above equation,
Z
A1




Multiplying both sides by ￿(a1);
Z
A1




Now, ￿0(k) < 0 implies that ￿(a1) < ￿(k)8k 2 B and ￿(a1) > ￿(k)8k 2 A1: Replacing ￿(a1) in
the above equation, Z
A1




Here we are using the fact that h(k) ￿ g(k) > 08k 2 B and g(k) ￿ h(k) > 08k 2 A1: We













44The LHS and the RHS are the demand for managers by workers in B [ A1 under G1 and G2
respectively. De￿ne maxA1 = a0
1 and minA2 = a2: Let C = [a0




























[g(k) ￿ h(k)]dk < (
Z
B
[h(k) ￿ g(k)]dk ￿
Z
A1

















Since ￿0(k) < 0; we have
Z
A2
￿(k)[g(k) ￿ h(k)]dk <￿(a2)(
Z
B






























Re-arranging gives us that the demand for managers by workers in B [ A1 [C [ A2 under G
is less than that under H: We can repeat this argument by expanding the set till we reach k￿: But
then we have shown that the demand for managers under G is less than that under H: However
the supply of managers under G is greater than that under H: Therefore, at k￿; there is an excess
supply of managers under G: Hence the threshold under G has to be greater than k￿:
Proof of Proposition 4. The derivation of the threshold is the same as in the proof of Proposition











































Not that the LHS is the excess demand for managers in the Home country if the threshold is
k￿


































A; the RHS is positive. But this means that k￿
I 6= k￿
A: In particular, since
the LHS is increasing in k￿
I and the RHS is decreasing, it must be the case that k￿
I > k￿
A
Proof of Proposition 5. We know that an allocation A is a Pareto improvement over allocation
B if u(xA
i ) ￿ u(xB
i ) for all i; and u(xA
j ) > u(xB
j ) for some j: This suggests that in order to show
that A is not a Pareto improvement over B, it is su¢ cient to show that 9 individuals 1 and 2 s.t.
u(xA
1 ) ￿ u(xB
1 ) ) u(xA
2 ) < u(xB








The above inequality suggests that under Integration, there are incumbent Home managers who
continue to operate (k 2 [k￿
I;NL;kH]): At the same time, under Autarky, m￿1
A;NL(k￿
A;NL) = k )
46m￿1
A;NL(k￿
I;NL) > k (follows from PAM). While under Integration, m￿1
A;NL(k￿
I;NL) = k; i.e. under
Integration, the manager with knowledge k￿
I;NL has a worse match. The present value of k￿
I;NL is
just the period pro￿ts ￿I;NL(k￿














I;NL)￿wI;NL(k))n(k): Therefore the relation between ￿A;NL(k￿
I;NL)
and ￿I;NL(k￿
I;NL) depends on the relation between wA;NL(k) and wI;NL(k): Let us consider the fol-
lowing cases -
(a) wA;NL(k) < wI;NL(k) : In this case, ￿A;NL(k￿
I;NL) > ￿I;NL(k￿
I;NL) ) k is strictly better-o⁄
under Integration but k￿
I;NL is strictly worse-o⁄




is strictly better-o⁄ under Integration but k is strictly worse-o⁄
(c) wA;NL(k) = wI;NL(k) : In this case, ￿A;NL(k￿
I;NL) ￿ ￿I;NL(k￿
I;NL): This is not a negation
of Pareto improvement. However let us choose the agent with knowledge k￿
I;NL + ￿ such that
m￿1
I;NL(k￿
I;NL + ￿) < m￿1
A;NL(k￿
I;NL + ￿): Since m(:) is continuous, we can always ￿nd such an ￿:

















Combined with wA;NL(k) = wI;NL(k); this means that in the neighbourhood of k = k;
wA;NL(k) < wI;NL(k): Hence
￿A;NL(k￿
I;NL + ￿)=(￿f(k￿











Using the fact that wA;NL(k￿
I;NL + ￿) < wI;NL(k￿










I;NL + ￿ is strictly worse-o⁄.
Hence, for all the 3 cases (a), (b) and (c), we have shown that atleast one individual is worse-o⁄.
Since these cases are exhaustive, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6. We proceed as follows - First we shall ￿nd the condition under which
47kH is better-o⁄ under Integration. Since kH is a manager under both Autarky and Integration,
we have to show that VM;I(kH) > VM;A(kH): Since kH is matched with k￿
A under Autarky and e k
under Integation, this implies that
[￿f(kH) ￿ wA(k￿
A)]n(k￿
A) < [￿f(kH) ￿ wI(e k)]n(e k)
Re-arranging, we have
￿f(kH)[n(k￿
A) ￿ n(e k)] < wA(k￿
A)n(k￿




A) ￿ wI(e k)n(e k)=
















































































































48Replacing them in the above equation,
wA(k￿
A)n(k￿
A) ￿ wI(e k)n(e k)>























A) ￿ n(e k)]<f(kH)[n(kH) ￿ n(k)]
=B(say)
Hence the su¢ cient condition for kH to be strictly better-o⁄ uder Integration is that A > B:





2f(kH)[n(kH) ￿ n(k)] + n(k)[￿(kH)f(kH) ￿ ￿(k)f(k)]
￿(k)[f(kF) + f(k)]n(k) ￿ ￿(kH)[n(k) + n(kH)]f(kH)
where ￿(k) =
n(k)
1+n(k) and ￿(kH) =
n(kH)
1+n(kH): Of course, this only ensures that kH is strictly better
o⁄. We need to show that every Home agent can be made better o⁄.
Notice that for k 2 [k;k￿
A]; agents are workers under both regimes. For k 2 [k￿
A;k￿
I]; agents
are workers under Integration but managers under Autarky. Finally for k 2 [k￿
I;kH]; agents are
managers under both regimes. In the steady-state, VM;i(k) = 1






i (k)): For k 2 [k￿
I;kH];
m￿1











M;I(k) < V 0
M;A(k)
Suppose VM;I(kH) > VM;A(kH): Since VM;A(:) is decreasing at a faster rate than VM;I(:) in the
neighbourhood [k￿









￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
wI(k) +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)





￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿f(mI(k))n0(k) +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)







A (k)): When ￿ = 1; V 0

























M;A(k) > V 0
W;I(k): Therefore, 9 ￿1 s.t. 8￿ > ￿1; V 0
M;A(k) > V 0
W;I(k) and hence VW;I(k) >
VM;A(k) for k 2 [k￿
A;k￿
I]: In particular, VW;I(k￿
A) > VM;A(k￿





￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
f(mA(k))n0(k) +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)








￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
f(mI(k))n0(k) +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)




When ￿ = 1; V 0
W;A(k) = f(mA(k))n0(k) > f(mI(k))n0(k) = V 0
W;I(k): Therefore, 9 ￿2 s.t. 8￿ >
￿2; V 0
W;A(k) > V 0
W;I(k) and hence VW;I(k) > Vw;A(k) for k 2 [k￿
A;k￿
I]: Hence if we choose ￿￿ =
maxf￿1;￿2g; 8￿ > ￿￿; VW;I(k) > Vw;A(k) for k 2 [k;kH]:
Derivation of the unit of time : In our paper, because of PAM, workers do not work for the
same manager for two consecutive periods. But we can think of each period as consisting of several
sub-periods. In each of these sub-periods, the worker learns a little bit and accordingly, his wage
also increases gradually. This wage increase does not take place in our model. This is because the
workers are implicitly tied to their managers for one period. We can think of the rising wages as
what the managers would have paid if the workers could potentially leave at any point in time. We
make some simplifying assumptions : Firstly, the wage growth takes place at a constant rate every
year. Secondly, although wages are growing, the manager￿ s earnings remain constant. And ￿nally,
the marginal increment to knowledge is constant over the sub-periods. The annual rate of growth
of wage due to knowledge accumulation turns out to be 2% (Basically we are solving for g; where
g satis￿es (1 + g)10 = 1:25). In our model, the di⁄erence between the earnings of the worker and
the manager is only due to a di⁄erence in their level of knowledge. In the U.S., on an average, the
manager￿ s wage is a little more than twice the wage of the worker (Source : U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics). Worker here refers to individuals engaged in all non-managerial occupations. Assuming
that the wage of the worker continues to rise at the rate of 2% per year, this essentially means that
the worker would catch up with the manager in around 34 years (Here we are using Assumption
(ii)). With an uniform learning distribution, the expected knowledge accumulated by the worker in
50one period lies half way between the worker￿ s initial knowledge and the knowledge of his manager.
Assumption (iii) then implies that in order to catch up with the manager, the worker￿ s knowledge
has to rise by a constant amount every period for 34 years. Therefore, the worker will reach the
half-way stage in 17 years. Hence the unit of time is 17 years.
Income groups : We have a total of 117 countries. The countries are classi￿ed according to
their per capita GDP in 1970.
High-income : Switzerland, Luxembourg, United States, Denmark, Sweden, Australia, Canada,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, France, Germany, Belgium, United Kingdom, Japan, Finland,
Austria, Italy, Iceland.
Middle-income (High) : Barbados, Argentina, Spain, Israel, Greece, Puerto Rico, Ireland,
Gabon.
Middle-income (Low) : Hong Kong, South Africa, Uruguay, Portugal, Namibia, Hungary, Mex-
ico, Cyprus, Venezuela, Trinidad &Tobago, Chile, Singapore, Peru, Poland, Costa Rica, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, Panama, Mauritius, Brazil.
Low-income (High) : Turkey, Iran, Papua New Guinea, Jamaica, Guatemala, Angola, Sey-
chelles, Zambia, Colombia, Cote d￿ Ivoire, Guyana, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Algeria, Taiwan, Guinea,
Malaysia, Tunisia, Korea, Republic of, Bolivia, Paraguay, Zimbabwe, Ecuador, Philippines, Co-
moros, Mozambique, Romania, Dominican Republic, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Central African Re-
public, Thailand, Jordan, Mauritania, Honduras.
Low-income (Low) : Ghana, Senegal, Togo, Gambia, The, Cameroon, Madagascar, Sri Lanka,
Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Botswana, Niger, Pakistan, Congo, Republic of, Chad, Benin, Bangladesh,
India, Congo, Dem. Rep., Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Haiti, Burundi, Lesotho, Nigeria, Indonesia,
Rwanda, Nepal, China, Mali, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Ethiopia, Uganda.
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